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War & ConflictActive2014 – presentUpdated 2026-09-0910 primary sources

Russia–Ukraine War

Ukrainian, Russian, Western and independent accounts of the same war differ on cause, conduct and terms. What the documents, treaties and investigations actually establish.

Parties: Ukraine · Russia · United States & NATO · UN & independent investigators

How We Analyze Stories

Section 01

The Issue

Russia launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022, eight years after annexing Crimea and backing armed separatists in Donbas.

The competing accounts are not only about events but about causation: Ukraine and its partners describe an unprovoked war of conquest against a sovereign state; Russia describes a defensive response to NATO expansion and to threats against Russian speakers.

Much of this dispute is resolvable against public documents — treaties, UN votes, court rulings and investigative findings — and this page separates that record from contested interpretation.

Section 02

Timeline

  1. 1994-12-05

    Budapest Memorandum signed

    Ukraine gives up the Soviet nuclear arsenal on its territory in exchange for security assurances from Russia, the United States and the United Kingdom respecting its borders.

    agreementBudapest Memorandum text (UN treaty registration)

  2. 2014-03

    Russia annexes Crimea

    Russian forces take control of Crimea; a referendum held under occupation is rejected as invalid by the UN General Assembly.

    eventUN General Assembly Resolution 68/262

  3. 2014–2015

    Donbas war and the Minsk agreements

    Fighting in eastern Ukraine is followed by two ceasefire agreements that are never fully implemented; each side blames the other.

    negotiationOSCE — Minsk agreements

  4. 2022-02-24

    Full-scale invasion begins

    Russia attacks across multiple fronts. The UN General Assembly demands withdrawal by a large majority.

    attackUN General Assembly Resolution ES-11/1

  5. 2022-03-16

    ICJ orders Russia to suspend operations

    The International Court of Justice issues provisional measures ordering Russia to suspend its military operations in Ukraine.

    statementICJ — Ukraine v. Russian Federation

  6. 2022-03–04

    Istanbul talks collapse

    Negotiations on neutrality and security guarantees break down amid the Russian withdrawal from around Kyiv and the discovery of mass killings in Bucha.

    negotiationUN Human Rights Council — Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine

  7. 2023-03-17

    ICC issues arrest warrants

    The International Criminal Court issues warrants relating to the unlawful deportation of children from occupied Ukraine.

    statementICC — situation in Ukraine

Section 03

Side-by-Side Positions

What Ukraine says

Ukraine

Government of Ukraine

This is a war of conquest against a sovereign state. Ukraine argues its alliance choices are its own under international law and that no security grievance authorises invasion.

Official Claim

Kyiv frames its position as self-defence under Article 51 of the UN Charter, seeking restoration of its internationally recognised borders and accountability for war crimes.

Supporting evidence

  • UN General Assembly resolutions rejecting the annexation and demanding withdrawal.
  • ICJ provisional measures ordering Russia to suspend military operations.
  • UN Commission of Inquiry findings of unlawful killings, torture and deportations in occupied areas.

Important context

  • The Budapest Memorandum traded Ukraine's inherited nuclear arsenal for assurances on its borders.
  • Ukraine's occupied territory includes its industrial and energy heartland.

Weaknesses & contradictions

  • Minsk implementation failures were not solely Russian; Ukraine also resisted the political sequencing the agreements required.
  • Wartime restrictions on media and opposition parties, however explicable, are real limits on scrutiny.
  • Battlefield claims from any belligerent, including Ukraine, require independent confirmation.

Original statements & documents

Section 04

Claim Check

Official ClaimIndependent EvidenceDisputed

“NATO promised never to expand eastward.”

Claimed by Russia

Partially Supported
Evidence supporting
Declassified records show Western officials made verbal statements in 1990 discussing no eastward deployment in the context of German reunification.
Evidence challenging
No treaty or binding instrument contains such a commitment, and the 1997 NATO–Russia Founding Act explicitly accepted enlargement while affirming sovereignty.
Independent verification
Archival record confirms the conversations; it does not support a binding promise.

“The 2022 invasion was lawful self-defence.”

Claimed by Russia

False
Evidence supporting
Moscow invoked Article 51 and treaties with the entities it had just recognised.
Evidence challenging
Ukraine had not attacked Russia; the UN General Assembly demanded withdrawal by 141 votes to 5, and the ICJ ordered the operation suspended.
Independent verification
Rejected by the UN's principal judicial organ and by the General Assembly.

“Russian forces committed war crimes in occupied areas.”

Claimed by Ukraine, UN bodies, ICC

Verified
Evidence supporting
UN Commission of Inquiry findings, forensic exhumations, satellite imagery, intercepted communications and ICC arrest warrants.
Evidence challenging
Russia denies the findings and calls the evidence staged, but has not submitted counter-evidence to any investigative body.
Independent verification
Independently documented by UN investigators and acted on by the ICC.

“Ukraine was ready to sign a neutrality deal in Istanbul in 2022 and the West blocked it.”

Claimed by Russian officials and some Western commentators

Insufficient Evidence
Evidence supporting
Draft communiqués circulated and participants confirm neutrality and security-guarantee terms were under discussion.
Evidence challenging
Participants disagree on how close agreement was; the talks coincided with the Bucha revelations, and Russia's demands on force limits and guarantors were never settled.
Independent verification
No agreed text was ever published. Reconstruction rests on partial drafts and conflicting participant accounts.

“Casualty figures published by either belligerent are accurate.”

Claimed by Russia and Ukraine, about their own and each other's losses

Unverified
Evidence supporting
Both publish figures, and independent projects corroborate parts of them from obituaries, probate records and imagery.
Evidence challenging
Both treat their own losses as state secrets; the UN publishes only figures it can verify and states the true totals are higher.
Independent verification
Independently unverifiable at the level of precision claimed.

Section 05

What Both Sides Agree On

Verified Fact
  • Russia annexed Crimea in 2014 and launched a full-scale invasion on 24 February 2022.
  • Ukraine gave up the Soviet nuclear weapons on its territory under the 1994 Budapest Memorandum.
  • NATO has expanded eastward since 1997, and Russia objected consistently and publicly to it.
  • The Minsk agreements were signed and never fully implemented.
  • Tens of thousands of civilians have been killed or injured, and millions displaced.

Section 06

Where the Accounts Conflict

Cause of the war

Russia describes a defensive response to encroachment; Ukraine and its partners describe conquest of a neighbour. The documentary record supports the legal case against invasion, while the record of Russian objections to NATO expansion is also real. These are separate questions and are routinely merged into one argument.

Conduct of the war

Atrocity findings by UN investigators and the ICC are documented; Russia rejects them wholesale. Independent verification inside occupied territory is largely impossible, so the documented record is a floor, not a total.

Losses

Both belligerents inflate enemy losses and conceal their own. No figure from either capital should be read as verified.

Whether peace was within reach in 2022

Participants in the Istanbul talks give incompatible accounts and no final text was published, so this remains an argument about counterfactuals rather than about evidence.

Section 07

Where It Went Sideways

What each side originally wanted

  • Ukraine

    Withdrawal to internationally recognised borders, binding security guarantees, reparations and accountability.

  • Russia

    Recognition of annexed territory, Ukrainian neutrality with limits on its armed forces, and sanctions relief.

  • United States & NATO

    No conquest by force, no direct NATO–Russia war, and a Ukraine capable of defending itself.

What was offered

  • In 2022 Ukraine discussed neutrality in exchange for guarantees from a group of guarantor states.
  • Russia offered troop pullbacks from around Kyiv while insisting on territorial and military-limit terms.
  • Western states offered arms, funding and sanctions rather than direct security guarantees.

What was rejected

  • Ukraine rejected recognition of annexation and caps on its own military.
  • Russia rejected withdrawal to pre-2022 lines as a starting point.
  • Prospective guarantors declined the binding automatic commitments the draft framework implied.

Stated reason for the breakdown

Kyiv cited the Bucha killings and the impossibility of trusting guarantees from the invading state; Moscow said Ukraine walked away under Western pressure. No agreed text exists to adjudicate between these accounts.

Deeper political & economic pressures

  • Neither government can survive politically after conceding what the other treats as a minimum.
  • The Budapest precedent means paper assurances now carry little value in Kyiv.
  • Sanctions, energy markets and arms-production capacity on both sides shape the timeline more than any negotiating round.

Could negotiations resume?

Realistically only around a ceasefire that freezes lines while leaving the territorial question formally unresolved — an outcome both governments currently reject in public.

Section 08

Independent Assessment

What is known

  • Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022 and annexed Crimea in 2014; the UN General Assembly rejected both by large majorities.
  • The ICJ ordered Russia to suspend its military operations; the ICC has issued arrest warrants concerning deportation of children.
  • UN investigators have documented unlawful killings, torture and deportations in occupied areas.
  • Ukraine surrendered inherited nuclear weapons in 1994 in exchange for assurances on its borders.

What is likely

  • Actual casualties on both sides substantially exceed the figures either government admits.
  • Neither side can achieve its stated maximum objective by force in the near term.

What is disputed

  • How much weight NATO enlargement carries as a cause rather than a justification.
  • How close the 2022 Istanbul talks came to an agreement.
  • The reliability of specific battlefield claims made by either belligerent.

What cannot be confirmed

  • Conditions in occupied territory and Russian detention facilities investigators cannot access.
  • Internal decision-making in Moscow and Kyiv about war aims.

Section 09

Primary Documents

Primary Source

Section 10

Sources